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Abstract
We consider standard cash-in-advance monetary models and show that
there are interest rate or money supply rules such that equilibria are unique.
The existence of these single instrument rules depends on whether the econ-
omy has an in￿nite horizon or an arbitrarily large but ￿nite horizon.
Key words: Monetary policy; interest rate rules; unique equilibrium.
JEL classi￿cation: E31; E40; E52; E58; E62; E63.
1. Introduction
In this paper we revisit the issue of multiplicity of equilibria when monetary policy
is conducted with either the interest rate or the money supply as the instrument of
￿This paper had an earlier version with the title "Conducting Monetary Policy with a Single
Instrument Feedback Rule". We thank Andy Neumeyer, Stephanie Schmitt￿ Grohe and Martin
Uribe for comments. We gratefully acknowledge ￿nancial support of FCT. The opinions are
solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Banco de Portugal,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.policy. There has been an extensive literature on this topic starting with Sargent
and Wallace (1975), including a recent literature on local and global determinacy
in models with nominal rigidities. We show that it is possible to implement
a unique equilibrium with an appropriately chosen interest rate feedback rule,
and similarly with a money supply feedback rule of the same type. This is a
surprising result because while it is well known that interest rate feedback rules
can deliver a locally unique equilibrium, it is no less known that they generate
multiple equilibria globally.
We show that the reason for the results is the model assumption of an in￿nite
horizon. In ￿nite horizon economies, the number of degrees of freedom in con-
ducting policy does not depend on the way policy is conducted. The number is
the same independently of whether interest rates are set as constant functions of
the state, or as backward, current or forward functions of endogenous variables.
In analogous ￿nite horizon economies, the number of degrees of freedom in
conducting policy can be counted exactly. The equilibrium is described by a
system of equations where the unknowns are the quantities, prices and policy
variables. There are more unknowns than variables, and the di⁄erence is the
number of degrees of freedom in conducting policy. It is a necessary condition for
there to be a unique equilibrium that the same number of exogenous restrictions
on the policy variables be added to the system of equations. Single instrument
policies are not su¢ cient restrictions. They always generate multiple equilibria.
This is no longer the case in the in￿nite horizon economy, as we show in this
paper.
Whether the appropriate description of the world is an in￿nite horizon economy
or the limit of ￿nite horizon economies, thus, makes a big di⁄erence for this
particular issue of policy interest, i. e. whether policy conducted with a single
instrument, such as the nominal interest rate, is su¢ cient to determine a unique
competitive equilibrium.
As already mentioned, after Sargent and Wallace (1975) and McCallum (1981),
there is a large literature on multiplicity of equilibria when the government fol-
lows either an interest rate rule or a money supply rule. This includes the liter-
ature on local determinacy that identi￿es conditions on preferences, technology,
timing of markets, and policy rules, under which there is a unique local equilib-
rium (see Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2000),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001, 2002), Benhabib, Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2001a),
Dupor (2001) among others). This literature has in turn been criticized by recent
work on global stability that makes the point that the conditions for local deter-
2minacy are also conditions for global indeterminacy (see Benhabib, Schmit-Grohe
and Uribe (2001b) and Christiano and Rostagno, 2002).
Our modelling approach is close to Adao, Correia and Teles (2003) for the case
with sticky prices. In this paper we show that even at the optimal zero interest
rate rule there is still room for policy to improve welfare since it is possible to use
money supply to implement the optimal allocation in a large set of implementable
allocations. This paper is also close to Adao, Correia and Teles (2004) where
we show that it is possible to implement unique equilibria in environments with
￿ exible prices and prices set in advance by pegging state contingent interest rates
as well as the initial money supply. Bloise, Dreze and Polemarchakis (2004) and
Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005) are also related research.
We assume that ￿scal policy is endogenous. Exogeneity of ￿scal policy could
be used, as in the ￿scal theory of the price level to determine unique equilibria.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we consider a simple cash in
advance economy with ￿ exible prices. In Section 3 we analyze a simple example
to discuss the properties of the equilibria obtained when a single monetary policy
instrument is used. In Section 4, we show that there are single instrument feedback
rules that implement a unique equilibrium. In Section 5 we show that in analogous
￿nite horizon environments the single instrument rules would generate multiple
equilibria. In Section 6, we show that the results generalize to the case where
prices are set in advance. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2. A model with ￿ exible prices
We ￿rst consider a simple cash in advance economy with ￿ exible prices. The
economy consists of a representative household, a representative ￿rm behaving
competitively, and a government. The uncertainty in period t ￿ 0 is described
by the random variable st 2 St and the history of its realizations up to period t
(state or node at t), (s0;s1;:::;st), is denoted by st 2 St. The initial realization s0
is given. We assume that the history of shocks has a discrete distribution. The
number of states in period t is ￿t.
Production uses labor according to a linear technology. We impose a cash-
in-advance constraint on the households￿transactions with the timing structure
described in Lucas and Stokey (1983). That is, each period is divided into two
subperiods, with the assets market operational in the ￿rst subperiod and the goods
market in the second.
32.1. Competitive equilibria
Households The households have preferences over consumption Ct, and leisure









where ￿ is a discount factor. The households start period t with nominal wealth
Wt: They decide to hold money, Mt, and to buy Bt nominal bonds that pay RtBt
one period later. Rt is the gross nominal interest rate at date t. They also buy
Bt;t+1 units of state contingent nominal securities. Each security pays one unit of
money at the beginning of period t + 1 in a particular state. Let Qt;t+1 be the
beginning of period t price of these securities normalized by the probability of
the occurrence of the state. Therefore, households spend EtQt;t+1Bt;t+1 in state
contingent nominal securities. Thus, in the assets market at the beginning of
period t they face the constraint
Mt + Bt + EtQt;t+1Bt;t+1 ￿ Wt (2.2)
Consumption must be purchased with money according to the cash in advance
constraint
PtCt ￿ Mt: (2.3)
At the end of the period, the households receive the labor income WtNt; where
Nt = 1 ￿ Lt is labor and Wt is the nominal wage rate and pay lump sum taxes,
Tt. Thus, the nominal wealth households bring to period t + 1 is
Wt+1 = Mt + RtBt + Bt;t+1 ￿ PtCt + WtNt ￿ Tt (2.4)
The households￿problem is to maximize expected utility (2.1) subject to the
restrictions (2.2), (2.4), (3.4), together with a no-Ponzi games condition on the
holdings of assets.






















, t ￿ 0 (2.7)
From these conditions we get EtQt;t+1 = 1
Rt.Condition (2.5) sets the intratem-
poral marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equal to the
real wage adjusted for the cost of using money, Rt. Condition (2.6) is an in-
tertemporal marginal condition necessary for the optimal choice of risk-free nom-
inal bonds. Condition (2.7) determines the price of one unit of money at time
t + 1, for each state of nature st+1, normalized by the conditional probability of
occurrence of state st+1, in units of money at time t.
Firms The ￿rms are competitive and prices are ￿ exible. The production func-
tion of the representative ￿rm is linear
Yt ￿ AtNt




Government The policy variables are taxes, Tt, interest rates, Rt, money sup-
plies, Mt, state noncontingent public debt, Bt. We can de￿ne a policy as a map-
ping for the policy variables fTt;Rt;Mt;Bt, t ￿ 0, all stg, that maps sequences of
quantities, prices and policy variables into sets of sequences of the policy variables.
De￿ning a policy as a correspondence allows for the case where the government
is not explicit about some of the policy variables. Lucas and Stokey (1983) de￿ne
policy as sequences of numbers for some of the variables. Adao, Correia and Teles
(2003) de￿ne policy as sequences of numbers for all the policy variables. Here
we allow for more generic functions (correspondences) for all the policy variables.
We do not allow for targeting rules that can be de￿ned as mappings from prices,
quantities and policy variables to prices and quantities.
The period by period government budget constraints are
Mt + Bt = Mt￿1 + Rt￿1Bt￿1 + Pt￿1Gt￿1 ￿ Pt￿1Tt￿1, t ￿ 0
Let Qt+1 ￿ Q0;t+1, with Q0 = 1. If limT!1 EtQT+1WT+1 = 0
1 X
s=0
EtQt;t+s+1Mt+s (Rt+s ￿ 1) = Wt +
1 X
s=0
EtQt;t+s+1Pt+s [Gt+s ￿ Tt+s] (2.9)
5Market clearing Market clearing in the goods and labor market requires
Ct + Gt = AtNt,
and
Nt = 1 ￿ Lt.
We have already imposed market clearing in the money and debt markets.
Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of policy variables, quan-
tities and prices such that the private agents maximize given the sequences of
policy variables and prices, the budget constraint of the government is satis￿ed
and the policy sequence is in the set de￿ned by the policy.
The equilibrium conditions for the variables fCt;Lt;Rt;Mt;Bt;Tt;Qt;t+1g are
the resources constraint
Ct + Gt = At(1 ￿ Lt), t ￿ 0 (2.10)
the intratemporal condition that is obtained from the households intratemporal






, t ￿ 0 (2.11)
as well as the cash in advance constraints (3.4), the intertemporal conditions (2.6)
and (2.7), and the budget constraints (2.9).
3. Example
In this section we consider a particular utility function to discuss the properties
of equilibria when the central bank chooses either the interest rate or the money
supply as the sole instrument of monetary policy. We discuss the properties of the
equilibria, paying particular attention to the so called local determinacy property
of the equilibrium. Local determinacy means that in the neighborhood of an
equilibrium there is no other equilibrium.
We also consider an interest rate feedback rule as the literature is currently
dominated by a rule-based approach to monetary policy. We review what is meant
by an interest rate feedback rule guaranteeing local determinacy and show that
local determinacy is achieved if the interest rate feedback rule satis￿es the Taylor
6principle. The Taylor principle is veri￿ed if in response to an increase in in￿ ation
the increase in the nominal interest rate is higher.
To simplify the presentation we take Gt = 0 and the utility function u(Ct;Lt) =
Ct+v (Lt); with v (Lt) increasing in Lt, limLt!0 v0 (Lt) = 1 and limLt!1 v0 (Lt) =
0. We consider 3 monetary policies: a constant interest rate, a constant growth
rate for the money supply and an interest rate feedback rule. For the sake of sim-
plicity we consider the deterministic environment, i.e. st = st+1 for all t. The
stochastic environment is considered in the appendix.
The equilibrium conditions for the variables fCt;Lt;Pt;Mt;Rtg are: the house-















Ct = A(1 ￿ Lt); (3.3)
and the cash in advance condition
Mt ￿ PtCt; with equality if Rt > 1: (3.4)
It will be useful for the discussion below to remember that from (3.1) and (3.3)
there is a positive relation between Lt and Rt and a negative relation between Ct
and Lt:
3.1. Constant interest rate
Here we assume that the central bank chooses to maintain a constant interest
rate equal to R ￿ 1: In this case Ct and Lt are pin down by (3.1) and (3.3).
The in￿ ation, ￿t, is pin down by (3.2), ￿t = R￿. Any positive real number is an
equilibrium P0. Thus, there is a multiplicity of equilibrium price sequences and
as a consequence from (3.4) a multiplicity of equilibrium money sequences. The
literature has a jargon for this result, it is said that the outcome of setting the
interest rate is real determinacy and nominal indeterminacy. All the equilibria are
locally undetermined as for any equilibrium price level there is another equilibrium
price level in its neighborhood. In a stochastic environment with nominal frictions,
7like sticky prices or sticky wages, the monetary policy of setting the interest rate
is less interesting since it leads to multiplicity of the real allocations. We clarify
this issue in the appendix.
3.2. Constant money growth
Here we study the equilibria when the central bank chooses M0 and a constant
rate of money growth of the form Mt = ￿tM0, where ￿ > 1
￿: There are many
equilibria. In order to show that, we ￿nd it useful to de￿ne real money as mt ￿ Mt
Pt ;
and replace (3.1) in (3.2)




There are two steady states: one with
mt+1
mt = 1; Rt = ￿
￿ > 1; Ct and Lt (= L)
that solve (3.1) and (3.3) for Rt = ￿
￿, and Pt satisfying (3.4) with equality. There
is another steady state with Rt = 1; Ct and Lt (= e L) that solve (3.1) and (3.3)









￿(e L). In this steady state in￿ ation is
determined but the initial price level is not since (3.4) may not be binding when
Rt = 1.
The remaining equilibria can be divided according to the value of leisure in
period zero, L0: There are many equilibria with L0 > L. From (3.5) we get
m1
m0 = ￿(L0) < 1. Thus, from (3.3) and the fact that (3.4) holds with equality
in period 1 we obtain L1 < L0 which implies ￿(L1) < ￿(L0): Proceeding in
this way we obtain mt and Ct approaching zero and Lt approaching 1: From (3.1)




￿(Lt) approaches in￿nity as the denominator approaches zero.
There are also equilibria with e L < L0 < L: By (3.1), R0 > 1, which means
that (3.4) holds with equality. From (3.5), (3.3) and the assumption that mt = ct
we get sequences fLt;Ct;mtg. Let t￿ be the ￿rst period such that Lt￿ obtained
from the process just described satis￿es (3.1) with Rt ￿ 1: The elements of the
sequence up to t￿ are part of the equilibrium, but the ones after are not. In period
t￿ (3.4) does not hold with equality which implies that Rt￿ = 1: This means that
in periods t￿;t￿ + 1;t￿ + 2;::: the equilibrium Lt must satisfy (3.1) for Rt = 1;






> 1 for t ￿ t￿; and in￿ ation is constant,
Pt+1
Pt = ￿
￿(e L) for t ￿ t￿, mt
approaches in￿nity and Pt approaches zero.
8The steady state associated with Rt = ￿
￿, for all t; is locally determined and
the steady state associated with Rt = 1, for all t; is locally undetermined.
3.3. Interest rate feedback rule
Now we study the equilibria when the central bank follows an interest rate feed-
back rule. Let R be a steady state equilibrium interest rate and let ￿ be the
corresponding steady state equilibrium in￿ ation rate. Then, R = ￿
￿, where 1
￿







where ￿￿ ￿ 1 (the Taylor principle), and ￿t ￿ Pt
Pt￿1. After substituting the Taylor
rule in the intertemporal condition of the household, (3.2), we get
zt+1 = (zt)
￿￿;
where zt = ￿t
￿: By recursive substitution we get
zt+k = (zt)
k￿￿; for all k and t: (3.6)
There is no condition to pin down the initial value for in￿ ation. Since the initial
in￿ ation level can be any value there is an in￿nity of equilibrium trajectories for
the in￿ ation rate. Nevertheless, they can be typi￿ed in 3 classes. Either in￿ ation
is constant, ￿t = ￿, or there is an hyperin￿ ation, ￿t ￿! 1, or in￿ ation is
approaching zero, ￿t ￿! 0. This is easy to verify. If ￿0 = ￿; then (3.6) implies
that ￿t = ￿ for all t: If ￿0 > ￿; then (3.6) implies that ￿t+1 > ￿t and ￿t ￿! 1;
since ￿￿ > 1: If ￿0 < ￿; then (3.6) implies that ￿t+1 < ￿t and ￿t ￿! 0; since
￿￿ > 1:
Thus, when the central bank follows a Taylor rule that obeys the Taylor prin-
ciple it is able to get local determinacy. In a neighborhood of the steady state
in￿ ation ￿ there is no other equilibrium in￿ ation trajectory. But we have just
seen that there is an in￿nity of other equilibria for in￿ ation which converge to zero
1Usually the Taylor rule is presented in its linearized form. As can be veri￿ed the linearized
version is,
Rt ￿ R = ￿ (￿t ￿ ￿):
9or to in￿nity. These results beg two interrelated questions: Why is local deter-
minacy such an interesting property? Or why has most of the literature assumed
that undesirable equilibria do not happen? We do not know the answer to these
questions.
It is easy to verify, using an argument similar to the one above, that if the
Taylor rule did not obey the Taylor principle, i.e. ￿￿ < 1, there would be just two
types of equilibrium. The steady state and an in￿nity of equilibria converging to
the steady state. At ￿rst sight it would seem that it would be preferable that a
central bank would follow a Taylor rule that did not satisfy the Taylor principle, as
"undesirable" equilibria, hyperin￿ ations or hyperde￿ ations would not be possible.
This conclusion is not correct because whenever there is multiplicity of equilibria
it may be possible that sunspots can cause large ￿ uctuations in in￿ ation. In￿ ation
can ￿ uctuate randomly just because agents come to believe this will happen.
Why do we get so many equilibria? Is it possible that we are forgeting equilib-
rium conditions? There are no more equilibrium conditions over these variables.
The so called transversality conditions are satis￿ed since in our economy there are
government bonds. Moreover, since our ￿scal authority has a Ricardian policy
the government￿ s in￿nite-horizon budget constraint does not provide additional
information. In particular it cannot be used to obtain the initial price level as it
is done in the ￿scal theory of price level literature.
There may be institutions that we have ignored in the model, which can be used
to eliminate some of these "undesirable" equilibria. For instance, in some models
an hyperin￿ ation can be eliminated if the central bank has su¢ cient real resources
and can commit to buy back its currency if the price level exceeds a certain level.
This is known as fractional real backing of the currency (seeObstfeld and Rogo⁄
(1983)). We are not going to pursue this issue here.
4. Single instrument feedback rules.
In this section we assume that policy is conducted with either interest rate or
money supply feedback rules. We show that there are single instrument feedback
rules that implement a unique equilibrium for the allocation and prices. The
proposition for an interest rate feedback rule follows:
Proposition 4.1. When the ￿scal policy is endogenous and monetary policy is







￿t is an exogenous variable, there is a unique equilibrium.





. Then the intertemporal and intratemporal conditions, (2.6) and (2.11)
can be written as
uC(t)
Pt







, t ￿ 0 (4.2)
These conditions together with the cash in advance conditions, (3.4), and the
resource constraints, (2.10), determine uniquely the variables Ct, Lt, Pt and Mt.
The budget constraints (4.4) are satis￿ed for multiple paths of the taxes and
state noncontingent debt levels￿
The forward looking interest rate feedback rules that guarantee uniqueness of
the equilibrium resemble the rules that appear to be followed by central banks.
The nominal interest rate reacts positively both to the forecast of future consump-
tion and to the forecast of the future price level. In this there is a di⁄erence to the
feedback rules that are usually considered in that it depends on the future price
level rather than in￿ ation.
Depending on the exogenous process for ￿t, with this feedback rule it is possible
to decentralize any feasible allocation distorted by the nominal interest rate. The
￿rst best allocation, at the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate, can also
be implemented. With ￿t = 1






, t ￿ 0
which, together with the resource constraint (2.10) gives the ￿rst best allocation







t, t ￿ 0;
11and the money supply is obtained using the cash-in-advance constraint, Mt =
P(At;Gt)C(At;Gt).
Allocations where in￿ ation is zero can also be implemented even if in this ￿ ex-
ible price environment they are not desirable. There are multiple such allocations




, t ￿ 0
where the functions C and L are the solution for Ct and Lt of the system of
equations given by (2.11) and (2.10).
For each path of the nominal interest rate, fRtg, associated with zero in￿ ation,
there is a unique path for f￿tg up to a constant term,
uC(C(At;Gt;Rt);L(At;Gt;Rt))
P
= ￿t, t ￿ 0.
In an economy where the use of money is becomes negligible which corresponds
to a cash-in-advance condition
vtPtCt ￿ Mt: (4.3)





, t ￿ 0
An analogous proposition to Proposition 3.1 is obtained when policy is con-
ducted with a particular money supply feedback rule.
Proposition 4.2. When the ￿scal policy is endogenous and the policy is con-




there is a unique equilibrium.
12Proof: Suppose policy is conducted according to the money supply rule Mt =
￿Rt￿1CtuC(t)








obtained from the intertemporal conditions (2.6), in addition to the resource con-
straints, (2.10) and the intratemporal conditions (2.11) determine uniquely the
four variables, Ct, ht, Pt, Rt in each period t ￿ 0 and state st.
The taxes and debt levels satisfy the budget constraint (4.4)￿
The result that there are single instrument feedback rules that implement a
unique equilibrium is a surprising one. In fact it is well known that interest rate
rules may implement a determinate equilibrium, but not a unique global equilib-
rium. To illustrate this, consider the case where monetary policy is conducted
with constant functions for the policy variables. We will show that in that case
an interest rate policy generates multiple equilibria. That result is directly ex-
tended to the case where the interest rate is a function of contemporaneous or
past variables.
4.1. Conducting policy with constant functions.
In this section, we show that in general when policy is conducted with constant
functions for the policy instruments, it is necessary to determine exogenously both
interest rates and money supplies.
The equilibrium conditions are the resources constraints, (2.10), the intratem-
poral conditions (2.11), the cash in advance constraints (3.4), the intertemporal






















These conditions de￿ne a set of equilibrium allocations, prices and policy vari-
ables. There are many equilibria. We want to determine conditions on the ex-
ogeneity of the policy variables such that there is a unique equilibrium in the
13allocation and prices. We ￿rst consider the case in which a policy are sequences
of numbers for money supplies and interest rates.
From the resources constraints,(2.10), the intratemporal conditions (2.11), and
the cash in advance constraints, (3.4), we obtain the functions Ct = C(Rt) and
Lt = L(Rt) and Pt = Mt
C(Rt), t ￿ 0. As long as uC(Ct;Lt)Ct depends on Ct or
Lt, excluding therefore preferences that are additively separable and logarithmic











, t ￿ 0 (4.5)
together with the budget constraints, (4.4).
Suppose the path of money supply is set exogenously in every date and state.
In addition, in period zero the interest rate, R0, is set exogenously and, for each
t ￿ 1, for each state st￿1, the interest rates are set exogenously in #St ￿1 states.
In this case there is a single solution for the allocations and prices. Similarly,
there is also a unique equilibrium if the nominal interest rate is set exogenously in
every date and state, and so is the money supply in period 0, M0, as well as, for
each t ￿ 1, and for state st￿1, the money supply in #St ￿ 1 states. The budget
constraints restrict, not uniquely, the taxes and debt levels.
The proposition follows
Proposition 4.3. Suppose policy are constant functions. In general, if money
supply is determined exogenously in every date and state, and if interest rates are
also determined exogenously in the initial period, as well as in ￿t￿￿t￿1 states for
each t ￿ 1, then the allocations and prices can be determined uniquely. Similarly,
if the exogenous policy instruments are the interest rates in every state, the initial
money supply and the money supply, in ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 states, for t ￿ 1, then there is
in general a unique equilibrium.
The proposition states a general result. In the particular case where the prefer-
ences are additively separable and logarithmic in consumption, and money supply
is set exogenously in every state, there is a unique equilibrium in the allocations
and prices. There is no need to set exogenously the interest rates as well. This
example is helpful in understanding the main point of the paper, that the degrees
of freedom in conducting policy depend on how policy is conducted and on other
characteristics of the environment.
144.2. Current or backward interest rate feedback rules .
We have shown Proposition 3.3. assuming that policy was conducted with con-
stant functions for the policy variables. However, the use of interest rate rules
that depend on current or past variables clearly preserves the same degrees of
freedom in the determination of policy, as identi￿ed in that proposition. When
￿scal policy is endogenous, it is still necessary to determine exogenously the levels
of money supply in some but not all states. The corollary follows
Corollary 4.4. When policy is conducted with current or backward interest rate
feedback rules and ￿scal policy is endogenous, there is a unique equilibrium if the
money supply is set exogenously in #St ￿ 1 states, for each state st￿1, t ￿ 1, as
well M0.
5. Robustness: Finite horizon.
We have shown in the previous section that there are interest rate rules that
implement a unique equilibrium but that current or backward feedback rules do
not. This means that even if the same number of instruments is set exogenously,
the remaining degrees of freedom in determining policy depend on how those
degrees of freedom are ￿lled. This happens because the model economy has an
in￿nite horizon.
If the economy had a ￿nite horizon it would be characterized by a ￿nite number
of equations and unknowns. In that case the number of degrees of freedom in
conducting policy is a ￿nite number that does not depend on whether policy is
conducted with constant functions, functions of future, current or past variables,
as long as these functions are truly exogenous, i.e. independent from the remaining
equilibrium conditions.
To determine the degrees of freedom in the case of a ￿nite horizon economy
amounts to simply counting the number of equations and unknowns. We proceed
to considering the case where the economy lasts for a ￿nite number of periods
T +1, from period 0 to period T. After T, there is a subperiod for the clearing of
debts, where money can be used to pay debts, so that
WT+1 = MT + RTBT + PTGT ￿ PTTT = 0
The ￿rst order conditions in the ￿nite horizon economy are the intratemporal
conditions, (2.11) for t = 0;:::;T, the cash in advance constraints, (3.4) also for














, t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1 (5.1)
and, for any 0 ￿ t ￿ T, and state st, the budget constraints
T￿t X
s=0
EtQt;t+s+1Mt+s (Rt+s ￿ 1) = Wt +
T￿t X
s=0




The budget constraints restrict, not uniquely, the levels of state noncontingent
debts and taxes. Assuming these policy variables are not set exogenously we can










, t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1 (5.2)
Note that the total number of money supplies and interest rates is the same.
There are ￿0 + ￿1 + ::: + ￿T of each monetary policy variable. The number of
equations is ￿0 + ￿1 + ::: + ￿T￿1. In order for there to be a unique equilibrium
need to add to the system ￿0 + ￿1 + ::: + 2￿T independent restrictions. One
possibility is to set exogenously the interest rates in every state and in addition
the money supply in every terminal node. Similarly there is a unique equilibrium
if the money supply is set exogenously in every state and the interest rates are set
in every terminal node. In this sense, the two monetary instruments are equivalent
in this economy.
When policy is conducted with the forward looking feedback rule in Section 2,
the policy for the interest rate in the terminal period RT, cannot be a function of
variables in period T + 1. If these rates are exogenous constants, it still remains
to determine the money supply in every state at T.
In this ￿nite horizon economy there is an exact measure for the degrees of
freedom in conducting policy. In an economy that lasts from t = 0 to t = T,
16these are ￿0+￿1+:::+2￿T. This measure does not depend on how policy is con-
ducted, whether with constant functions or functions of endogenous variables, and
it also does not depend on price setting restrictions. The price setting restrictions
introduce as many variables as number of restrictions.
6. Robustness: Price setting restrictions
In this section we show that the results derived above extend to an environment
with prices set in advance. We modify the environment to consider price setting
restrictions. There is a continuum of goods, indexed by i 2 [0;1]: Each good i
is produced by a di⁄erent ￿rm. The ￿rms are monopolistic competitive and set
prices in advance with di⁄erent lags.


























The households￿intertemporal and intratemporal conditions are as before, (2.5),
(2.6) and (2.7).












;￿ > 0 (6.2)
Given the prices on each good i in units of money, Pt(i), the government minimizes

















di = AtNt: (6.4)
We consider now that ￿rms set prices in advance. A fraction ￿j ￿rms set prices
j periods in advance with j = 0;:::J ￿ 1: Firms decide the price for period t with
the information up to period t ￿ j to maximize:
Et￿j [Qt￿j;t+1 (pt(i)yt(i) ￿ Wtnt(i))]
subject to the production function
yt(i) ￿ Atnt(i)







where yt(i) = ct(i) + gt(i)
The optimal price is




























When we compare the two sets of equilibrium conditions, under ￿ exible and
prices set in advance, here we are adding more variables, the prices of the dif-
ferently restricted ￿rms, but we also add the same number of equations. This
argument works in this case, because we can write the new equations as functions
of current and past variables.
187. Concluding Remarks
The problem of multiplicity of equilibria under an interest rate policy has been ad-
dressed, after Sargent and Wallace (1975) and McCallum (1981), by an extensive
literature on determinacy under interest rate rules. Interest rate feedback rules
on endogenous variables such as the in￿ ation rate can, with appropriately chosen
coe¢ cients, deliver determinate equilibria. There are still multiple equilibria but
only one of those equilibria stays in the proximity of a steady state.
In this paper we show that in a simple monetary model with ￿ exible prices or
prices set in advance there are interest rate feedback rules, and also money supply
feedback rules, that implement unique equilibria. The interest rate feedback rules
are forward rules that resemble the policy rules that central banks follow.
The results are not robust to the following change in the theoretical environ-
ment. The model economy has an in￿nite horizon. Suppose that we considered
instead the analogous ￿nite horizon economy. In that economy, for an arbitrar-
ily large horizon, single instrument feedback rules would not implement unique
equilibria.
8. Appendix
Here we consider the example of section 3 in a stochastic environment and an-
alyze the constant interest rate policy and the interest rate feedback rule. The







From the deterministic to the stocastic framework only the intertemporal condi-
tion changes, all the remaining conditions remain the same.
8.1. Constant interest rate
Here we assume that the central bank chooses to mantain a constant interest rate
equal to R ￿ 1: As in the deterministic case Ct and Lt are pin down by (3.1) and
(3.3). Now it is the expected in￿ ation, ￿t, that is pin down by (3.2), Et￿t+1 =
R￿. There are many distributions of realized in￿ ation that are compatible with
that expected in￿ ation and all can be part of an equilibrium. There is as well
a multiplicity of equilibrium price sequences and as a consequence from (3.4) a
multiplicity of equilibrium money sequences.
19If there were frictions in the economy, like sticky wages, prices or portfolios,
a constant interest rate policy would not determine the real allocation. In this
case there would be a real indeterminacy, see Adªo, Correia and Teles (2003).
The intratemporal condition of the households would be di⁄erent. For instance,
if prices were set in advance the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption would be equal to the real wage adjusted for the interest rate, but
in general the real wage would not be a linear function of the technological shock.
Since prices are predetermined the allocation would be determined by the money
supply. It would be necessary to choose the money supply in some but not all
states of nature to determine the allocation.
8.2. Interest rate feedback rule
The introduction of the concept of the time-invariant equilibrium is necessary
to study local determinacy. This concept of equilibrium is the equivalent in the
stochastic environment to the steady state equilibrium in the deterministic envi-
ronment. In order to proceed an assumption is made, for each state st, the shocks
(At) have an identical and independent distribution. The time-invariant equilib-
rium is a competitive equilibrium with the property that it is just a function of the
shock. Formally, the time-invariant equilibrium is a tuple for consumption, leisure,

























R(st)Et [uC (st+1)]: (8.2)
For a given R(st) the two middle equations determine C(st) and L(st): Given
￿ the ￿rst equation determines the growth rate of money between a state and any
of its subsequent states. Finally (8.2) determines R(st): For the particular utility





20That is the time-invariant nominal interest rate does not depend on the shocks.






where ￿￿ ￿ 1 (the Taylor principle), and ￿t = Pt
Pt￿1.













where zt = ￿t



















t ; for all k;t (8.5)
In the following paragraph we supply an heuristic proof that the only equilibria
are the time-invariant equilibrium and an in￿nity of other equilibria which have
the characteristic that in some states of nature either in￿ ation is going to in￿nity
or is going to zero.
Since ￿￿ > 1; if z
￿1
t > 1 then z
￿1
t ! 1 with positive probability. The
proof is by contradiction. Assume it was not converging to in￿nity with positive
probability, then it would be bounded with probability one, which means that no
matter how arbitrary in the future you take the z
￿1
t+s its expected value would be
bounded with probability one. But since the exponent is a constant smaller than
one by taking s su¢ ciently large will get the left hand side of (8.5) smaller than
the right hand side. By a similar argument if z
￿1
t < 1; have z
￿1
t ! 0 with positive
probability.
Thus, when the central bank follows a Taylor rule that obeys the Taylor prin-
ciple it is able to get local determinacy. In a neighborhood of the time-invariant
equilibrium with in￿ ation ￿ there is no other equilibrium. We have just seen
that the other equilibria which are in￿nite in number are either associated with
in￿ ation converging with probability bounded from zero to in￿nity or to zero.
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